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COMES NO\V, the Respondent by and through Kelley K. Fleming, Assistant City
Attorney, and hereby files its Respondent's Brief in the above-captioned matter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the evening of Sunday, December 26, 2010, the sound of shattering glass from a
dental office across the street drew the attention of Jarod Hendryx ("Hendryx"). (R. 000825, Ex.
1.) He left the residence he was at, crossed the street to investigate, and found a female climbing
through a broken basement window of a dental center. Id. 'When he first saw her, she was
halfway through the broken basement window. Id.

He asked her if she was okay and she

responded by "looking at him kind of crazy" and stating she was trying to get her keys. Id. In his
subsequent call to 911, Hendryx reported the woman seemed to be "under the influence of either
drugs or major alcohol," "really lethargic" and "totally out of it." Id. It was later determined that
the woman crawling through the basement window was Plaintiff Melene James ("James") and
that she really was extremely intoxicated. A hospital laboratory report showed her alcohol level
to be .27 and she also tested positive for cannabinoids. (R. 000196.)
When Hendryx called 911 he reported a "breaking and entering" at the dental center. (R.
000825, Ex. 1.) Officers from the Boise Police Department ("BPD") were dispatched to the
location for a "burglary in progress" and were provided the information reported by Hendryx. (R.
000245, Ls. 8-17.) Defendant Officer Steven Butler ("Officer Butler") was the first officer on
scene, arriving at approximately 5:30 p.m., followed by Officer Barber. (R. 000203, Ls. 12-14.)
\Vhen Officer Butler arrived, he spoke with Hendryx about what he had witnessed. (R.
000205 Ls. 1-9; R. 000206, Ls. 1-25.) Officer Butler then personally observed the broken
window and relayed that information to other officers responding to the scene. (R. 000207, Ls.
14 through R. 000208, L. 1.) Through a different basement window, Officer Butler observed a
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\voman in the building. (R. 000209, Ls. 1-11.) He observed that this woman was holding a knife
and drinking from a beer can. (R. 000210, Ls. 9-14.) Specifically, she had a Steele Reserve 211,
which is a type of malt beverage. (R. 000211, Ls. 13-25; R. 000212, Ls. 1-19.) The knife she was
holding in her other hand had a blade of approximately four or five inches. (R. 000213, Ls. 321.) As Officer Butler watched, he noted that the woman was rummaging through items on a
table. (R. 000214, Ls. 4-16; R. 000215, Ls. 5-9.) He observed these things for a brief period of
time before the woman, later identified as James, moved away from the window and out of view.
(R. 000216, Ls. 2-9.) He then provided the information he had obtained to other responding
officers. (R. 000217, Ls. 6-10.)
\Vhen Officer Barber arrived on scene, he spoke to a cleaning lady and obtained a key to
the building. (R. 000231, Ls. 14-21; R. 000234, Ls. 2-8.) He also made contact with building coowner Dr. Carrick Brewster. (R. 000229, L. 25 through R. 000230, L. 2.) Dr. Brewster was on
scene and advising officers that no one should be in his building, especially if the person had to
gain entry by breaking out a window. (R. 000235, Ls. 1-18.)
At approximately 6:00 p.m., Defendant Officer Steven Bonas ("Officer Bonas") received
a request for a patrol K-9 to the burglary in progress call at the dental center. (R. 000248, Ls. 419.) Officer Bonas, a member of BPD's canine unit, responded with his police dog Ruwa and
was briefed by officers already on scene. (R. 000244, Ls. 19-22; R. 000249, Ls.15-23.) In
particular, he learned that both the building owner and the cleaning person had advised officers
that nobody should be in the building and that the person in the building had been seen with a
knife. (R. 000252, Ls. 9-25; R. 000256, Ls. 15-18; R. 000257, Ls. 3-17 .) He also personally
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observed the broken \Vindow 1 and noted that the majority of the building was dark. (R. 000254,
Ls. 1-8; R. 000255, Ls. 8-13.) At this time, Officer Bonas was aware that there had been several
recent burglaries of local dental offices. (R. 000263, Ls. 9-23.) He was also aware that dental
offices contain many nontraditional weapons. (R. 000264, Ls. 9-15.) He considered that, since
the majority of the unfamiliar building was dark, the suspect would have the tactical advantage
(i.e. cover and concealment) and could easily be lying in wait. (R. 000265, Ls. 3-8; R. 000276,
Ls. 24-25.)
As the canine handler, Officer Bonas needed to determine whether the situation justified
canine use and appropriate tactical measures to be taken. (R. 000344-345, para. 8; R. 000347
through 000358.) The decision regarding Rmva's deployment was made based upon the abovedescribed factual information in conjunction with the following factors from the BPD policies
and Procedures Manual and SOP#P3.0001.0:
•

The severity of the crime;

•

Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers
and others;

•

Whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest at the time; and

•

Whether deployment of the canine presented a danger to the safety of
uninvolved citizens and other officers.

Officer Bonas ultimately determined the use of a police dog was both reasonable and
necessary, as well as the safest manner to search for the suspect and, hopefully, gain a peaceful
surrender. (R. 000258, Ls. 15-16; R. 000290, Ls. 1-8; R. 000344-345, at para. 8 & 9.) Several
1 Shattered glass from the broken window still littered the floor when officers were clearing the basement, indicating
James had not made any attempt to clean it up despite the length of time that had passed since James' entry through
the window. (R. 000265, Ls. 21 through R. 000266, L. 4.)
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commands to exit the building prior to exposure to the canine \Vere provided to James but she
refused all of them. (R. 000268, Ls. 24-25.) The first command was given prior to officers' entry
into the building. Officer Butler used the PA system in a patrol car to give a canine
announcement. (R. 000247, Ls. 2-18.) Through such announcements, police identify themselves
to the suspect, identify why they are there, give instructions on what they want the suspect to do
and advise the suspect that ifhe does not surrender then a police dog will be used to find him and
they may be bit. (R. 000259, Ls. 7-15; R. 000260, Ls. 2 through R. 000261, L. 9.)
Subsequent to the PA announcement, Officer Bonas made announcements at the front
door after opening it with a key but before making entry. (R. 000271, Ls. 11-20.) After the
announcement \Vas given Ruwa began barking loudly. (R. 000825, Ex. 2.) No response was
received so officers entered the building with Ruwa to search for the suspect. (R. 000271, Ls. 1120.) Midway through the search of the top floor, Officer Bonas downed Ruwa and provided
another announcement. (R. 000272, Ls. 10-16.) Ruwa again barked loudly. (R. 000825, Ex. 2.)
Despite the commands, followed by the dog's loud barking within the building, still no one
surrendered. Id.
Once the top floor of the business had been searched, the police officers staged at the top
of the stairs leading to the basement. (R. 000273, Ls. 6-8.) Officer Bonas yelled another K-9
announcement down the narrow stairway which was again followed by Ruwa barking. (R.
000273, Ls. 6-14; R. 000825, Ex. 2; R. 000299, Ls. 6-13.) Again, no one called out to surrender
or even make their presence known. Id. At this point, officers were facing a blind corner at the
bottom of the staircase with no idea whether someone was down in the dark, unfamiliar
basement lying in wait. (R. 000278, Ls. 1-3.) Officer Bonas gave Ruwa the command to search
and Ruwa proceeded down the stairs to do so. (R. 000275, Ls. 4-9.)
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A short time later, Officer Bonas heard Ruwa go

a bark alert. (R. 000275, Ls. 14-

22.) This indicated to him that Ruwa had located the source of the odor of a suspect(s) but had
yet to actually find the person. (R. 000276, Ls. 6-23.)

Officer Bonas gave Ruwa the bite

command to encourage Ruwa to locate the source of the human odor. (R. 000277, Ls. 4-10.)
After a pause, Officer Bonas heard screaming and realized that Ruwa was on the bite. (R.
000277, Ls. 4-12; R. 000179, Ls. 5-10; R. 000195, R. 000825, Ex. 2.) He issued a command for
the suspect to call out or surrender to no avail. (R. 000279, Ls. 11-16.)
The officers went down the stairs to the bathroom where Officer Bonas reports seeing
through the door opening the suspect's torso and Ruwa in the bathroom. (R. 000279, L. 17
through R. 000280, L. 12.) Then the bathroom door closed. (R. 000280, Ls. 13-15.) One of the
officers pushed the door open. (R. 000282, L. 22 through R. 000283, L. 6.) At this point Officer
Bonas saw Ruwa biting the suspect's right arm. (R. 000284, Ls. 5-7.) Once officers were able to
clear James' hands, Officer Bonas gave Ruwa commands to release and lay down; Ruwa
immediately obeyed. (R. 000284, L. 8 through R. 000285, L. 10; R. 000286, Ls. 3-5; R. 000287,
Ls. 7-12; R. 000825, Ex. 2.) The entire duration of the bite was a matter of seconds, well under a
minute. (R. 000288, Ls. 9-12; R. 000310, Ls. 19-24; R. 000311, Ls. 18-20; R. 000825, Ex. 2.)
The arrest team then handcuffed James, and she was escorted out of the building to
receive immediate medical attention from Ada County Paramedics who were already on scene.
(R. 000237, Ls. 18-22; R. 000238, Ls. 6-17; R. 000232, Ls. 14-20; R. 000304, Ls. 1-3.) Dr.
Brewster advised officers he wanted to press charges against James for the damage she caused to
his building. (R. 000302, L. 11 through R. 000303, L. 14.)
James does not have a memory of her encounter with Ruwa. (R. 000321, Ls. 19-23.)
After entering the lab through the window she broke, she remembers only finishing up some
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\Vork, drinking a Steele Reserve of unknown O\Vnership in an effort to help her calm down, and
then going into the bathroom.2 (R. 000317; R. 000318, Ls. 11-24, and R. 000320.) Thus, the
majority of the above events are documented through the accounts of the officers on scene and
police audio recordings.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Respondents seek an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and
Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121. The standard for an award of attorney fees under these
statutory provisions is similar.
A.

Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

In order to be awarded attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court must
determine whether a party is in fact a prevailing party. Santiago v. Municipality ofAdjuntas, 741
F.Supp.2d 364, 369 (2010). A prevailing party has been defined as one who has been awarded
some relief by the court. Buckhannon Bd. And Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health
and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1839 (2001). There is no question

that Respondents are the prevailing party in this action.
In addition to being the prevailing party, a defendant must establish that the plaintiffs
suit was "totally unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable or that the plaintiff continued
to litigate after it clearly became so". Santiago, 741 F.Supp.2d at 370. A court will determine
whether frivolity exists by considering (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case;
(2) whether the defendant offered to settle; (3) and whether the trial court dismissed the case
prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits. Cases sustaining the frivolity standard
include decisions on summary judgment in a defendant's favor where plaintiffs did not offer
evidence to support their claims. Id.
2

Oddly enough, there was no light on in the bathroom and the room was pitchblack. (R. 000287, Ls. 7-12.)
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As to the instant case, the District Court granted summary judgment on the merits in
favor of Respondents and dismissed the action in its entirety. (R. pp. 000732 through 000779.)
The Appellant was unable to establish a prima facie case against Respondents sufficient to
support the conclusion that Respondents impermissibly used excessive force in the arrest and
seizure of Appellant. Id. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, then, Respondents are entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney fees.

B.

Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-117

Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for the mandatory award of attorney fees to the prevailing
party in administrative or civil judicial proceedings with a city. Idaho Trial Handbook § 36:11
(2d ed. 2013); City of Osborn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,909,277 P.3d 353, 356 (2012). The
award of attorney fees can arise if the case is brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Nation v. Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158
P.3d 953, 970 (2006); Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Tvvin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 212, 159
P.3d 840, 849 (2007). As argued later in this brief, Appellant's claims are without foundation as
Appellant failed to introduce any significant probative evidence supporting her complaint.

C.

Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-121

Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 if the appellant
simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the District Court on conflicting evidence.
Here Appellant was dissatisfied with the lower court's factual findings and determination and
has done "little more than invite this Court to second-guess those findings." Doe v. Doe, 149
Idaho 669,675,239 P.3d 774, 780 (2010); Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 596, 166 P.3d 382,
386 (2007). Respondents are therefore entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees under this
statute.
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Under the above statutory provisions, Respondents respectfully request an award of
attorney fees and costs on this appeal.

ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Properlv Determined That the Operative Facts were
Undisputed and Did Not Fail to Review the Record in a Light Most
Favorable to the Appellant.

James' argument that this case presents numerous disputed facts is meritless. \Vhile it is
well-established that the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, it is equally well-established
that a party is entitled to summary judgment when the record shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776
(2007)(facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only ifthere is a
genuine dispute as to those facts). "Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the
case." Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F .3d 1178, 1185 (9 th Cir. 2006). The facts material to
this case are not genuinely in dispute.
The "numerous" facts James alleges are in dispute are simply not material to a proper
excessive force analysis. For example, a determination as to whether Hendryx actually saw
James break the basement window or just heard it breaking and then saw her climbing through it
would not affect the outcome of the force analysis. It is undisputed that, in her intoxicated state,
she broke the basement window thereby gaining entry to the building. That fact, in conjunction
with the statement by the building owner that no one should be in the building, supports the
burglary in progress characterization of Hendryx' 911 call. Likewise, whether the PA
announcement warning was made from Officer Butler's patrol car or Officer Barber's patrol car
and James' questioning of the timing of warnings issued by police would not affect the outcome
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as (1) officer audio recordings establish that police gave several loud yet unheeded warnings; and
(2) James has no recollection of warnings such that she cannot credibly dispute them even if they
were not captured on audio. Scott v. Harris, supra, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S. Ct. 1776 ("When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of vvhich is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.").
James' argument consists of a desperate attempt to create factual disputes that either do
not exist (e.g., Respondents never argued that Jared Hendryx saw James break the window) or do
not matter (e.g. which patrol car the PA announcement was issued from). The material facts are
not genuinely in dispute. The District Court properly recognized this when, first noting the
unique nature of this case, it stated "[u]nlike most excessive force claims where the parties'
accounts of the events markedly diverge, the operative facts here are undisputed." (R. 000745.)
That is not an erroneous characterization of this case. The availability of audio recordings,
James' lack of recollection of key events and the lack of dispute over statements from Mr.
Hendryx and building owner Dr. Brewster markedly distinguish this case from those that require
a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions.
The District Court thoroughly analyzed the operative facts and applicable law in arriving
at its decision to grant summary judgment for Respondents. James cannot sufficiently support
her assertion that the Court erred in concluding the operative facts were undisputed. To defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment the nonmoving party must introduce some
significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint. Fazio v. City & County of San
Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9 th Cir. 1997) quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). A showing of some "metaphysical doubt" to the
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material facts or providing "conclusory, speculative testimony" ,,vill not raise a genuine issue of
fact to defeat summary judgment. Nfatsushita Elec Indus Co v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574,
586, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9 th Cir.
2007). The absence of a genuine issue of material fact in this case means that only a question of
law remains. Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 863 (2011 ).

B.

The District Court Properly Determined that the Level of Intrusion on
James' Constitutional Rights was Serious or Significant. not Moderate or
Severe.

James alleges that the nature and quality of the intrusion on her Fourth Amendment
interests was severe. She supports this allegation by reference to her medical records for a
description of the injuries she sustained. The District Court recognized that "[w]ithout question,
James sustained significant and lasting injuries." (R. 000746.) However, unlike James, the court
also took into account the duration of the bite. The audio recording, officer testimony, and
James' lack of recall led to the indisputable conclusion that the bite lasted no more than 36
seconds. The court correctly compared both the bite duration and the injuries sustained to other
court decisions that have evaluated the quantum of force in dog bite cases.
The District Court found the present factual scenario analogous to that in Miller v. Clark
County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9 th Cir. 2003). In Miller, the court determined that the intrusion (a

45-60 second bite that caused severe injury) was serious or significant, not moderate or severe.
James takes issue with the court's reliance upon Miller. Yet, the Ninth Circuit case analyzed
below that found a severe intrusion from a dog bite, Chew v. Gates, is easily distinguishable
from the present case in both bite and injury severity (multiple bites, dragging plaintiff up to ten
feet and nearly severing plaintiffs arm). 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9 th Cir. 1994). Thus, while the
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court is required to view the factual record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is not
required to ignore undisputed facts and applicable law favorable to Respondents. In this case
both the material facts and the applicable law support the District Court's conclusion that the
intrusion was serious or significant.

C.

Graham v. Connor Does Not Require the Court to Review the Record in a
Light Most Favorable to Plaintiff Before Applving Various Factors.

James argues that the District Court was obligated to view the facts in a light most
favorable to her BEFORE it applied the Graham analysis. (Appellant's Br., p. 26.) This is a
puzzling assertion to the extent it begs the question: how can you view facts favorable to a
plaintiff without the legal framework to know what makes a fact favorable? James states that by
concluding the facts were undisputed the District Court failed to consider how certain factual
disputes, if viewed in her favor, would affect the analysis of these various factors. (Appellant's
Br., p. 26.) This seems to be taking issue with the lower court's legal (not factual) analysis.
A fact is either disputed or not regardless of the applicable analysis; the legal analysis
tells us what facts are material - which is important because some facts do not matter regardless
of whether they are disputed. This argument appears to be nothing more than a nonsensical
attempt to circumvent the well-established tenant of the Graham analysis that "[t]he
'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S.
386,396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989).
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D.

\Vhether the District Court Erred bv Finding that the Officers Had No
Reason to Question \Vhether a Burglarv was Committed.

James avers there were numerous facts \vhich should have caused the police to question
whether a burglary was actually occurring. She claims that the District Court improperly
concluded that the officers reasonably believed she was engaged in a burglary (Appellant's Br.,
p. 27.) Characterization of the crime in question as a burglary is supported by the undisputed
facts that on the Sunday night after Christmas, James broke a window to a closed dental building,
crawled through it into the basement, and was seen by an officer drinking and rummaging
through instruments. The 911 caller reported a breaking and entering by an intoxicated woman,
responding officers observed the broken window and were definitively advised by the building
owner that no one was supposed to be inside. This was occurring in an area that had recently
experienced thefts from other dental offices. Such facts are pretty significant clues that a
burglary is afoot. Despite the foregoing, James points to facts which she claims should have
caused police to question whether a burglary was actually occurring.
First, she points to "omissions of fact in the officers' reports." (Appellant's Br., p. 27.) It
is not clear to Respondents what the alleged unidentified omissions in the reports are. In
addition, it is not clear what any omissions in the reports that would have necessarily been
prepared well after the call's conclusion would have to do with a decision by officers at the
active crime scene as to the type of crime they were facing.
Next, James relies upon the affidavit of her expert, Dan Montgomery, to call into
question the characterization of the incident as a burglary. Mr. Montgomery feels that
Respondent officers should have questioned whether a burglary was actually occurring and
investigated further into whether James worked in the building. Montgomery places great weight
on the facts that James told Hendryx she was getting her keys, that she remained on scene despite
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being seen by Hendryx, that she is female, that she took the time to drink a beer and manipulate
dental instruments, and the cleaning lady said a female \Vorked in the building. James relies on
the foregoing facts to the exclusion of a totality of the circumstances analysis. ~Marquez v. City of
Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167, 1174-75 (9 th Cir. 2012)(consider relevant factors to effect a totality of

the circumstances analysis). As previously discussed above, there were several other facts to
suggest that a burglary was actually occurring which James fails to include in her analysis.
Montgomery's subsequent armchair quarterbacking would, as the lower court stated, be more
appropriate to a probable cause analysis but, in any event is conclusory and unduly favorable to
James. Soremekun, supra, 509 F.3d at 984 (conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits is
insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment).
James also claims that further investigation by officers would have affected the severity
of crime analysis (not just the probable cause argument) because the crime of breaking a window
is significantly different than the crime of burglary. If James had simply broken a window then
the crime at issue may be malicious injury to property, a misdemeanor assuming the window was
valued at less than $1,000.00. See Idaho Code§ 18-7001(1). However, it is undisputed that after
James broke the window, she crawled through it to enter the building. That important fact points
to burglary, a felony. See Idaho Code § 18-1401. As recognized by the District Court, James
conceded below that burglary is a serious crime. (R. 000748; R. 000662.)
Finally, James attempts to distinguish cases relied upon by the District Court. vVith
respect to Reed v. Wallace, No. 12-CV-1948(PJS/JSM), 2013 vVL 6513346 (D. Minn. Dec. 12,
2013), James points out that Reed involved the burglary of a dwelling occupied by a woman at
night rather than an empty commercial building. As noted above, James conceded below that
burglary is a serious crime and she did so without distinguishing between the types of locations
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where burglaries may occur. James also

a reasonable inference may be drawn that she

never had a knife since one was never found and Hendryx did not see it. However, Officer Butler
testified that he saw James holding a knife and other involved officers testified that they were
advised James was seen holding a knife or edged instrument. On summary judgment, the Court
may not make credibility determinations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
With respect to Lmvry v. San Diego, No. 11-CV-946-MMA(\VMC), 2013 \VL 2396062

(S.D. Calif. May 31, 2013), James points out that the police in Lo,vry had extremely limited
information whereas police in the present matter had much more information with which to call
into question whether she was a burglar. This argument flies in the face of her primary argument
on appeal, supported by the opinions of Dan Montgomery, that police should have a duty to
further investigate the nature of an apparent crime prior to canine deployment.
As the foregoing demonstrates, there can be no genuine dispute as to the propriety of the
characterization of the crime at issue as a burglary. Further, both James' concession below and
applicable law support the District Court's conclusion that burglary is a serious crime. See Idaho
Code §§ 18-1403 and 18-111; Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011 )("Burglary is
dangerous because it can end in confrontation leading to violence."); Miller v. Clark County, 340
th

F.3d 959, 964 (9 Cir. 2003)(felonies are by definition crimes deemed serious by the state).

E.

The District Court Properlv Determined that James Posed an Immediate
Threat to Police.

James relies upon Dan Montgomery's affidavit as evidence in support of her assertion
that she did not present an "immediate" threat to investigating officers. However, the content she
relies upon is conclusory and, therefore, not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and defeat
summary judgment. Soremekun, supra, 509 F.3d at 984.
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Next, James analyzed the factors relied upon by the District Court in support of its
determination that it was objectively reasonable to conclude James posed an immediate threat.
One such factor is that James was armed with a bladed tool. James attempts to defeat this factor
by calling into question Officer Butler's credibility. However, as previously noted, on summary
judgment the court may not make credibility determinations. Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 255.
James also argues that even if she was holding a weapon, she was not threatening anyone with it.
Of course, she did not know police were present when she was observable to them. When it
came down to the point in time when officers would be attempting to seize James, the fact that
she had a weapon at her disposal would obviously pose a threat to them. The District Court
logically determined the immediacy of the threat is to be examined at the time the seizure is
attempted (R. 000755 through 000756) not, as James would have you believe, at the outset of the
investigation when Officer Butler saw James through the basement window (Appellant's Br., p.
42.)
James next argues that although intoxicated she was described as lethargic and totally out
of it and, therefore, did not present a threat. Despite being described as lethargic by Hendryx, she
managed to break a window, crawl through it and apparently conduct business in the dental lab
while continuing to drink. Further, it has been recognized by the Ninth Circuit in another
excessive force case that people under the influence of mood altering substances often act in an
unpredictable, irrational manner and, regardless of their physical size, can inflict serious injuries
th

when resisting an officer. Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 982 (9 Cir. 2010).
James also questions the assumption that she was hiding in a dark, unfamiliar building
based upon her failure to comply with multiple warnings to surrender or risk getting bit. She
asserts it is disputed whether officers attempted to look into the lit dental lab for activity and that
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the number and timing of warnings are disputed. Such assertions are immaterial and/or incorrect.
Officer Butler looked into the basement and saw James for a brief period before she went out of
view. \v1lether officers attempted to look in is immaterial to the force analysis. In addition, the
number and timing of warnings cannot reasonably be disputed as they are captured on audio tape
(with the exception of the PA announcement that officers testified was made and which James
cannot dispute due to her lack of recall).
The next argument put forth by James is that officers were only tactically disadvantaged
if they decided to enter the building. Of course, officers could avoid all risk if they decided not to
do their jobs. The District Court points out that James conceded at oral argument below that
officers did not have to \vait James out. (R. 000756, fn.21.) Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
specifically recognized that the government has an undeniable, legitimate interest in
apprehending criminal suspects, which is even stronger when, as here, the criminal is suspected
of a felony. ~Miller v. Clark County, supra, 340 F.3d at 964.
James has analyzed each factor in a vacuum. Yet, as previously discussed herein, the
appropriate method of analysis for this type of claim involves consideration of the totality of the
circumstances. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014). Each of the above factors,
taken together, demonstrate the immediate threat posed by James when officers attempted to
locate her in the building.

F.

\Vhether the District Court Erred in Making the Factual Determination that
James was Activelv Resisting and Evading Arrest bv Hiding.

James asserts that her failure to respond to repeated warnings from officers regarding the
canine cannot be a basis to conclude she was actively resisting arrest. She argues this is so

16

because no warnings were issued before the decision to deploy a canine had been made. This
theory has no legal or logical support.
An excessive force analysis logically takes place at the time force is to be applied. An
officer's decision that a canine would be deployed, in and of itself, is obviously not a use of
force. At that point there has been absolutely no intrusion on a Fourth Amendment interest. See
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). Moreover, the decision could be rescinded at
any time prior to actual deployment. Under James' theory, a cause of action could accrue based
upon the decision or idea alone.
Further, the audio recording supports the conclusion that James was purposely attempting
to evade detection. It evidences the repeated, loud warnings issued to James, follmved by loud
barking from the canine inside the building, none of which James acknowledged. Such warnings,
issued in a closed building at night could lead to no other rational conclusion other than that
James was in fact intentionally disregarding officer's warnings and commands to surrender.
James' discussion of police policy concerning warnings has no bearing on this analysis.

G.

The District Court Properly Found that Additional Factors Also \Veighed in
Defendants' Favor.

The District Court stated it was undisputed that officers gave several warnings to James,
both prior to entering the building and throughout the building search. (R. 000760.) However,
James states she never conceded that a PA announcement was made. Despite her lack of
concession, multiple officers testified regarding the PA announcement. James claims either to
not have heard it or to not recall it. As the District Court stated, that is immaterial to the analysis.
Lowry, 2013 WL 2396062 at *6. Rather, what matters is whether officers actually issued the
warnings. Marquez v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9 th Cir. 2012). James cannot
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genuinely dispute the issuance of a PA announcement. Even assuming arguendo that no PA
announcement was made, the officer audio recordings establish the undisputable existence of
multiple other warnings provided to James such that the PA announcement itself is immaterial.
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in finding this factor weighs in Respondent's favor.
James states that the District Court incorrectly found that there were inadequate
alternative levels of force available to officers. James' failure to provide factual or legal support
for this assertion is glaring. She indicates the police should have instructed the canine to just bark
at her rather than bite. James cites to no support for this alternative. In contrast, Officer Bonas
testified to the inadequacy of mere barking and that the method used by BPD, the Handler
Controlled method, is actually safer for both the dog and the officer. (R. 000278, Ls. 4-1 O; R.
000765.) Moreover, Respondents pointed out below that lesser alternatives such as verbal
commands and police presence were employed but ineffective.
Next, James alleges Respondents failed to comply with police department policy that
instructs before using a canine to search a building, officers should contact the building o\vner if
possible and determine if there are tenants, obtain a layout of the building and evacuate tenants
prior to the search. It is undisputed that Respondents established contact with building owner Dr.
Carrick Brewster, that Dr. Brewster responded to the scene and spoke with Officer Barber prior
to Ruwa's introduction into the building. It is further undisputed that Dr. Brewster told Officer
Barber that no one should be in the building, especially if the person had to break a window to
gain entry. James argues officers should have followed up with information from the cleaning
lady. This policy specifically refers to the building owner, not the cleaning staff. Officers
complied with BPD policy when they contacted Dr. Brewster as described. Further, James's
assertions regarding tenant evacuation are unfounded as this investigation occurred on a Sunday
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evening when the building was closed and, as Dr. Brewster advised, no one was supposed to be
in his building. Accordingly, the District Court properly found this factor weighs in favor of
Respondents.
The plaintiff's mental and emotional state is an additional factor for consideration in the
totality of circumstances analysis. Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 980 (9 th Cir. 2010).
James was obviously impaired by at least alcohol at all times relevant to this matter. Hendryx
reported she was totally out of it and heavily under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Officer
Butler observed James drinking a Steele Reserve malt liquor. Even approximately an hour after
she was seized her blood alcohol content was over three times the legal limit for a driver. Luchtel
recognized the potential for unpredictability and violence by a suspect under the influence.
Despite the fact that James did not actually exhibit aggressive behavior towards officers, it
cannot be denied that her mental state was significantly impaired by alcohol such that this factor
also properly weighs in Respondents' favor.

H.

\Vhether Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Should be Dismissed on Grounds
Reasonable Minds Could Determine that the Governmental Interest is
Outweighed bv the Level of Intrusion Against James's Rights.

James argues there are too many factual disputes for summary judgment to be
appropriate. That is simply not the case. As discussed above, none of the factual disputes raised
by James created a genuine issue of material fact worthy of withholding summary judgment.
Moreover, the District Court correctly determined that while the degree of intrusion or injury
was significant, each Graham factor, as well as the additional factors included in the totality of
the circumstances analysis overwhelmingly weigh in Respondents' favor. (R. 000766.)
Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim.
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James' next argument is that her 1'vfonell claim was erroneously dismissed. Afonell v.
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). She states whether or not her complaint raised a
A1onell claim was never at issue, that parties are not required to respond to issues which are not

raised by the opposing party. However, why would Respondents argue a claim that was never
asserted against them? It is clear from James' complaint that she did not include a Afonell claim
and the court should affirm it's dismissal on that basis. See Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(l); Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807 (2010)(A cause of action not raised in a
party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the
first time on appeal); A1atter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093 (Ct. App. 1990)(appellate
court can affirm lower court's decision on different legal theory). Alternatively, dismissal should
be affirmed for the reason stated by the District Court that the appropriate resolution of James' §
1983 claim in Respondents' favor also disposes of any Monell claim. (R. 000766.)
James also asserts that the District Court erred in granting immunity to individual
officers. A qualified immunity analysis consists of two parts: (1) whether the facts a plaintiff has
alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue
was clearly established at the time of defendants' alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223,232, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). The first prong is already addressed herein at the
excessive force analysis. With respect to the second prong of the analysis, the District Court
relied upon findings in Chew v. Gates, Miller v. Clark County and Lowry v. City of San Diego for
its determination that as of December 2010, there was no clearly established law proscribing the
use of police dogs under circumstances presented to Respondent officers. (R. 000770 through
000771.) James failed to provide any argument or legal support to the contrary. A party waives
an issue on appeal when the party fails to provide authority supporting its argument. Puckett v.
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Oak Fabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 821 (1999). Accordingly,

finding of qualified immunity

belo\v must be affirmed.
I.

State Law Claims

1.

Respondents are entitled to immunity under Idaho Code § 25-2808.

James conceded at oral argument that if the use of the canine was constitutionally
reasonable as it related to her excessive force claim, then the immunity provision of Idaho Code
§ 25-2808 bars her state law claims. (R. 000771 through 000772; Appellant's Br., p. 64.)
Moreover, the District Court found there was simply no evidence that Ruwa was not used
reasonably and carefully. Id. at p. 41. The absence of any genuine issue of material fact on an
element of the nonmoving party's case has been shown and James has not come forward with
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact on this issue. Smith v. Meridian Joint School
District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719 (1996). Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to immunity on
the state law claims pursuant to Idaho Code§ 25-2808.

2.

State law claims of assault, battery. false arrest and \vTongful
imprisonment were properly dismissed.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act provides immunity to Respondents from liability for James'
claims of assault, battery, false arrest and wrongful imprisonment unless malice or criminal
intent can be shown. Idaho Code § 6-904. James concedes that the record does not support a
conclusion of ill will. (Appellant's Br., p. 65.) Likewise, Respondents assert there is simply no
evidence in the record to support a finding of criminal intent. As previously argued herein, there
can be no genuine dispute that all material facts pointed to a burglary in process and that
investigating officers followed the policies of their department with respect to utilization of a
canine to search the building for the suspected burglar. Moreover, the duration of the bite itself,
up to 36 seconds, evidences the lack of criminal intent in and of itself.
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3.

The District Court did not err in dismissing James' claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires, inter alia, extreme and
outrageous conduct by Respondents. Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 739 (Ct. App. 2006).
In addition, the level of emotional distress must be so severe that no reasonable person would be
expected to endure it. Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 306 (Ct. App. 2001). The record is
simply devoid of any evidence to meet these elements and the District Court's conclusion in that
regard should be affirmed. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Brmrn v.
City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806 (2010).
4.

The District Court did not err in dismissing James' claim for negligent
failure to train, supervise and control.

James' final claim was properly dismissed on the grounds that the claim itself
contemplates the existence of a compensable underlying tort, which is not present in this case.
(R. 000776.) The District Court also concluded that substantial evidence was lacking that

Respondents failed to properly train, supervise and control Ruwa. Id. Respondents submitted
evidence of both Ruwa's and Officer Bonas' training and certification and of Ruwa's utilization
in accordance with BPD policy. James submitted just the conclusory statements of Dan
Montgomery. Accordingly, the District Court's conclusion as to this claim should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the above arguments, Respondents respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the decision of the District Court as to all issues raised on appeal.
DATED this ----.__ day of September 2014.
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